Business Plan For A Company In The Food Industry. Ricer Essay

Business Plan For A Company In The Food Industry. Ricer - Essay Example The services will be based cash on delivery and cash with order. Ricer’s services will be commonly known as Ricer Vending Units. The original trial was conducted in October 25th, 2012 which was highly applauded by most residents within the city and projected to be a success once it will be launched. The business intends to expand gradually through franchises to other cities and states in the next ten years. Market Analysis The business is projected to be worth  £ 250,000 which will serve the local markets that are vast and well segmented. The population consists of 50.6% of female and 49.4% of men while the median age is around 34.8 years and the entire working population is 311,300 and the residential population goes at 506,800 according to statistics done in mid 2009. The City has a higher young age profile which will form an essential market for the Ricer’s products. This profile of the population reveals that the target consumers will most likely be the young and vibrant students and the working group. Thus the products will be distributed near colleges and University campuses, weekend markets and other convenient places such as leisure parks (Daniels, 2002, p. 53). Strategy and Implementation Ricer aims to create a brand recognition using its Ricer vending Units through positioning strategically in the entire business district within the city. Upon achieving the brand recognition, the services will be provided and eventually they will be available in major superstores and supermarkets (Stokes and Wilson, 2010, p. 3). Moreover, Ricer will then provide franchises to foster further expansion. 1.5 Management The Ricer will be owned by two ladies with massive experience in the business management, product promotion and hospitality industry. The pioneers are based from two different diversities which include; Chinese culture and the English culture. They were previous staff of a renowned restaurant in the world having worked for about ten years. They intend to employ other staff to help them in the preparation and distribution of food to the target market in the streets. 1.6 Financial Plan Ricer is projected to have a formidable starting financial base even though it will need extra funding to accomplish its goals and objectives. According to the analysis of the forecasts the revenue from the business is expected to grow to ? 7.5 million by year 5 and subsequently to ? 15.75 million by year 10 with an EBITDA amounting to ? 5 million by year 5. An initial survey from the streets it was determined that the firm would need to sell 75 meals to breakeven. The profound financial strategy ascertains that the firm will be more favorable as an acquirement for exit (Bhide?, 2000, p. 5). 1.7 Start-up funds and expenses This business plan will attract the following start up funds and start-up expenses. Start-up Expenses Legal ? 250 Marketing consultants ? 750 Design costs ? 2,500 Payroll expenses ? 12,000 Fuel costs ? 2,500 Business and Liability cover policy ? 5000 Total Expenses ? 23000 Start-up Assets Cash needs ? 250,000 Start-up Inventory ? 50,000 Other Short term assets ? 25,000 Total Short Term Assets ? 25,000 Non-current Assets ? 50,000 Total Assets ? 400,000 Start-up Funding for the fast food firm Investment for the business Rickrosly ? 150,000

Discussion Essay Qustion Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 250 words - 2

Discussion Qustion - Essay Example These winds are also known to change their directions every now and then, especially during the night. Sea and land winds are the ones we encounter on a daily basis. These winds are not much strong when compared with Santa Ana winds (Kissell, 2011). Santa Ana winds on the other hand flows at a distance relatively high from the surface of the earth. These winds are dry and extremely strong. Santa Ana winds are known to originate from the inland. Noticeable effects of these winds have been seen in the coastal regions of Southern California. Geologists have further provided that Santa Ana winds do not take any specific direction (Kissell, 2011). When a wind firm wants to put a new turbine, for electricity generation, they must put into consideration the direction of the wind. For the case of land and mountain winds, the turbine should be set in a manner that allows flexibility based on the direction of the wind at that specific moment. A fixed turbine may be put in place when considering Santa Ana winds as they do not have a specific direction. Situating turbines on mountainous locations may pose the problem of power evacuation and maintenance. Sea and land winds are believed to be important since they are available on flat ground/terrains (Chiras Sagrillo & Woofenden, 2010). They are thereby used in generation of electrical energy. Implementation of the local grid is also easier on flat

Analysis of Weinbergers Concepts of Cyberwarfare

Analysis of Weinbergers Concepts of Cyberwarfare In June 2010, analysts from the antivirus software company VirusBlokAda examined a computer in Iran due to suspicion of malware activity. Lurking inside the machine was a computer worm known as Stuxnet. Stuxnet possessed an array of abilities, among them was the ability to target the software that controls pumps, valves, generators and other industrial machines (Weinberger, 2011). Unlike other viruses that use forged security clearances to gain access into systems, Stuxnet took advantage of two digital certificates of authenticity stolen from respected companies (Weinberger, 2011). Furthermore, it exploited four different zero day vulnerabilities' which are security gaps that system creators were unaware of (Weinberger, 2011). According to Liam O Murchu, chief of security response of Symantec, once Stuxnet infected a system, the crucial parts of its executable code would become active only if that machine was also running Siemens Step 7, one of the many supervisory control and data (SCADA) systems used to manage industrial processes (Weinberger, 2011). Symantec also discovered that the majority of infections were in Iran and that the infections seemed to have been appearing there in waves since 2009 (Weinberger, 2011). Further investigation performed by Ralph Langner, a control-system security consultant, resulted in evidence that Stuxnet had been deliberately directed against Iran, the most likely target being Irans Nuclear Enrichment Facility in Natanz. (Weinberger, 2011). According to Langner, Stuxnet was designed to alter the speed of the delicate centrifuges which separated Irans rare but fissionable isotope uranium -235 from the heavier uranium -238 (Weinberger, 2011). Improper alteration of the cent rifuges could result in them spinning out of control and breaking. Although the Iranian Government refuses to admit that Stuxnet was responsible for the destruction of many centrifuges at Natanz, the results from Langner and others is credited by reports from the International Atomic Energy Agency. The IAEA documented a precipitous drop in the number of operating centrifuges in 2009, the year that many observers think Stuxnet infected computers in Iran (Weinberger, 2011). There is no evidence beyond rumor that Israel or the US Government may have been behind the attack. Symantec notes that a name embedded in Stuxnets code, Myrtus, could be a reference to a biblical story about a planned massacre of Jews in Persia (Weinberger, 2011). Moreover, Langner believes that the U.S. Government could have been behind the attack considering they possess both the required expertise in cyber warfare and a long-standing goal of thwarting Irans nuclear ambitions (Weinberger, 2011). Irrespective of Stuxnets creator, the main growing fear is who will redesign it. Stuxnet was the first weapon created entirely out of code and proved that groups or nations could launch a cyber-attack against a societys vital infrastructures (Weinberger, 2011). Many of the investigators that studied Stuxnet concluded that it essentially laid out a blueprint for future attackers to learn from and perhaps improve (Weinberger, 2011). Stuxnet opened a new era of warfare and with its code available online for anyone to study and improve, it has computer scientists like Yuval Elovici concerned that the next wave of cyber-attacks would be much stronger than the impact of setting several atomic bombs on major cities (Weinberger, 2011). In IS THIS THE START OF CYBERWARFARE? Sharon Weinberger questions whether or not Stuxnet started a new era of warfare. One might find that Weinbergers use of supporting evidence from many credible sources imposes a compelling answer to an interesting topic of study. Weinberger emphasizes the inferred answer is indeed yes, Stuxnet introduced a new era of warfare. Statements such as Stuxnet is the harbinger of a new generation of cyber threats and that it provided chilling proof that groups or nations could launch a cyber-attack against a societys vital infrastructures are well validated by the many investigators that studied it (Weinberger, 2011). Overall, one would appreciate Weinbergers supportive writing style and the information she presented in this article. Weinberger was heavily resourceful and made certain that every point she made was reinforced by credible supporting evidence. Furthermore, one would relish how she tailored her article to a broader audience. Easy and straightforward for a non tech-savvy individual to understand, and yet interesting to captivate the minds of those that are tech-savvy, she capitalized on the statements made from some of the most respected cyber security experts in the world. As a student who often finds himself being the rescue to many of his friends or familys infected PCs, choosing Stuxnet as my topic of study seemed like the obvious choice. I have always been very interested in computer malware since the day my laptop first got infected. I was bombarded with annoying ads telling me that I had a virus on board and that I needed to type in my credit card number to purchase antivirus protection. Although very annoying, it had me asking myself many questions like how did this happen, isnt Windows secure and best of all how do I delete my browsing history. Since then, I have always had a keen interest in malware and have developed a hobby of testing the capabilities of different antivirus programs in VMware Player. I find many things interesting about Stuxnet but the thing I find most interesting is how it spread. Although Stuxnet possessed the ability to spread through networks, it couldnt infect industrial control systems via the internet since a majority of them lack internet connectivity to protect them from malware and hostile takeover. (Weinberger, 2011). To get past this obstacle, Stuxnet had the ability to covertly install itself on a USB drive (Weinberger, 2011). Like a biological virus, Stuxnet used humans (plant operators specifically) as its host of transmission. If one careless plant operator were to plug in an infected USB flash drive into a control-system computer, Stuxnet would begin its destruction.   Weinberger, S. (2011, June 9). IS THIS THE START OF CYBERWARFARE? Nature, 142-145. Retrieved from http://search.proquest.com.uproxy.library.dc-uoit.ca/docview/872363390?accountid=14694 Last years Stuxnet virus attack represented a new kind of threat to critical infrastructure. Just over a year ago, a computer in Iran started repeatedly rebooting itself, seemingly without reason. Suspecting some kind of malicious software (malware), analysts at VirusBlokAda, an antivirus-software company in Minsk, examined the misbehaving machine over the Internet, and soon found that they were right. Disturbingly so: the code they extracted from the Iranian machine proved to be a previously unknown computer virus of unprecedented size and complexity. On 17 June 2010, VirusBlokAda issued a worldwide alert that set off an international race to track down what came to be known as Stuxnet: the most sophisticated computer malware yet found and the harbinger of a new generation of cyberthreats. Unlike conventional malware, which does its damage only in the virtual world of computers and networks, Stuxnet would turn out to target the software that controls pumps, valves, generators and other industrial machines. It was the first time wed analysed a threat that could cause real-world damage, that could actually cause some machine to break, that might be able to cause an explosion, says Liam O Murchu, chief of security response for the worlds largest computer-security firm, Symantec in Mountain View, California. Stuxnet provided chilling proof that groups or nations could launch a cyberattack against a societys vital infrastructures for water and energy. We are probably just now entering the era of the cyber arms race, says Mikko Hypponen, chief research officer for F-Secure, an antivirus company based in Helsinki. Worse yet, the Stuxnet episode has highlighted just how inadequate are societys current defences and how glaring is the gap in cybersecurity science. Computer-security firms are competitive in the marketplace, but they generally respond to a threat such as Stuxnet with close collaboration behind the scenes. Soon after Virus- BlokAdas alert, for example, Kaspersky Lab in Moscow was working with Microsoft in Redmond, Washington, to hunt down the vulnerabilities that the virus was exploiting in the Windows operating system. (It was Microsoft that coined the name Stuxnet, after one of the files hidden in its code. Technically, Stuxnet was a worm, a type of malware that can operate on its own without needing another program to infect. But even experts often call it a virus, which has become the generic term for self-replicating malware.) One of the most ambitious and comprehensive responses was led by Symantec, which kept O Murchu and his worldwide team of experts working on Stuxnet around the clock for three months. One major centre of operations was Symantecs malware lab in Culver City, California, which operates like the digital equivalent of a top-level biological containment facility. A sign on the door warns visitors to leave computers, USB flash drives and smart phones outside: any electronic device that passes through that door, even by mistake, will stay there. Inside the lab, the team began by dropping Stuxnet into a simulated networking environment so that they could safely watch what it did. The sheer size of the virus was staggering: some 15,000 lines of code, representing an estimated 10,000 person hours in software development. Compared with any other virus ever seen, says O Murchu, its a huge amount of code. Equally striking was the sophistication of that code. Stuxnet took advantage of two digital certificates of authenticity stolen from respected companies, and exploited four different zero day vulnerabilities previously unidentified security holes in Windows that were wide open for hackers to use. Then there was the viruss behaviour. Very quickly we realized that it was doing something very unusual, recalls O Murchu. Most notably, Stuxnet was trying to talk to the programmable logic controllers (PLCs) that are used to direct industrial machinery. Stuxnet was very selective, however: although the virus could spread to almost any machine running Windows, the crucial parts of its executable code would become active only if that machine was also running Siemens Step7, one of the many supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems used to manage industrial processes. Many industrial control systems are never connected to the Internet, precisely to protect them from malware and hostile takeover. That led to another aspect of Stuxnets sophistication. Like most other malware, it could spread over a network. But it could also covertly install itself on a USB drive. So all it would take was one operator unknowingly plugging an infected memory stick into a control-system computer, and the virus could explode into action. 6.1 Murky Motives It still wasnt clear what Stuxnet was supposed to do to the Siemens software. The Symantec team got a clue when it realized that the virus was gathering information about the host computers it had infected, and sending the data back to servers in Malaysia and Denmark presumably to give the unknown perpetrators a way to update the Stuxnet virus covertly. Identifying the command and control servers didnt allow Symantec to identify the perpetrators, but they were able to convince the Internet service providers to cut off the perpetrators access, rerouting the traffic from the infected computers back to Symantec so that they could eavesdrop. By watching where the traffic to the servers was coming from, O Murchu says, we were able to see that the majority of infections were in Iran at least 60% of them. In fact, the infections seemed to have been appearing there in waves since 2009. The obvious inference was that the virus had deliberately been directed against Iran, for reasons as yet unknown. But the Symantec investigators couldnt go much further by themselves. They were extremely knowledgeable about computers and networking, but like most malware-protection teams, they had little or no expertise in PLCs or SCADA systems. At some point in their analysis they just couldnt make any more sense out of what the purpose of this thing was, because they were not able to experiment with the virus in such a lab environment, says Ralph Langner, a control-system security consultant in Hamburg, Germany. Langner independently took it upon himself to fill that gap. Over the summer, he and his team began running Stuxnet in a lab environment equipped with Siemens software and industrial control systems, and watching how the virus interacted with PLCs. We began to see very strange and funny results immediately, and I mean by that within the first day of our lab experiment, he says. Those PLC results allowed Langner to infer that Stuxnet was a directed attack, seeking out specific software and hardware. In mid-September 2010, he announced on his blog that the evidence supported the suspicion that Stuxnet had been deliberately directed against Iran. The most likely target, he then believed, was the Bushehr nuclear power plant. 6.2 Industrial Sabotoge Speculative though Langners statements were, the news media quickly picked up on them and spread the word of a targeted cyberweapon. Over the next few months, however, as Langner and others continued to work with the code, the evidence began to point away from Bushehr and towards a uranium-enrichment facility in Natanz, where thousands of centrifuges were separating the rare but fissionable isotope uranium-235 from the heavier uranium-238. Many Western nations believe that this enrichment effort, which ostensibly provides fuel for nuclear power stations, is actually aimed at producing a nuclear weapon. The malware code, according to Langner and others, was designed to alter the speed of the delicate centrifuges, essentially causing the machines to spin out of control and break. That interpretation is given credence by reports from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna, which document a precipitous drop in the number of operating centrifuges in 2009, the year that many observers think Stuxnet first infected computers in Iran. True, the evidence is circumstantial at best. We dont know what those machines were doing when they werent in operation, cautions Ivanka Barszashka, a Bulgarian physicist who studied Iranian centrifuge performance while she was working with the Federation of American Scientists in Washington DC. We dont know if they were actually broken or if they were just sitting there. Moreover, the Iranian government has officially denied that Stuxnet destroyed large numbers of centrifuges at Natanz, although it does acknowledge that the infection is widespread in the country. And IAEA inspection reports from late 2010 make it clear that any damage was at most a temporary setback: Irans enrichment capacity is higher than ever. However, if Natanz was the target, that does suggest an answer to the mystery of who created Stuxnet, and why. Given the knowledge required including expertise in malware, industrial security and the specific types and configurations of the industrial equipment being targeted most Stuxnet investigators concluded early on that the perpetrators were backed by a government. Governments have tried to sabotage foreign nuclear programmes before, says Olli Heinonen, a senior fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University in Cambridge, Massachusetts, and former deputy director-general of the IAEA. In the 1980s and 1990s, for example, Western governments orchestrated a campaign to inject faulty parts into the network that Pakistan used to supply nuclear technology to countries such as Iran and North Korea. Intelligence agencies, including the US Central Intelligence Agency, have also made other attempts to sell flawed nuclear designs to would-be proliferators. Stuxnet, says Heinonen, is another way to do the same thing. Langner argues that the government behind Stuxnet is that of the United States, which has both the required expertise in cyberwarfare and a long-standing goal of thwarting Irans nuclear ambitions. Throughout the summer of 2010, while Langner, Symantec and all the other investigators were vigorously trading ideas and information about Stuxnet, the US Department of Homeland Security maintained a puzzling silence, even though it operates Computer Emergency Readiness Teams (CERTs) created specifically to address cyberthreats. True, the CERT at the Idaho National Laboratory outside Idaho Falls, which operates one of the worlds most sophisticated testbeds for industrial control systems, did issue a series of alerts. But the first, on 20 July 2010, came more than a month after the initial warning from Belarus and contained nothing new. Later alerts followed the same pattern: too little, too late. A delayed clipping service, said Dale Peterson, founder of Digital Bond, a SCADA security firm in Sunrise, Florida, on his blog. There is no way that they could have missed this problem, or that this is all a misunderstanding. Thats just not possible, says Langner, who believes that the Idaho labs anaemic response was deliberate, intended to cover up the fact that Stuxnet had been created there. But even Langner has to admit that the evidence against the United States is purely circumstantial. (The US government itself will neither confirm nor deny the allegation, as is its practice for any discussion of covert activity.) And the evidence against the other frequently mentioned suspect, Israel, is even more so. Symantec, for example, points out that a name embedded in Stuxnets code, Myrtus, could be a reference to a biblical story about a planned massacre of Jews in Persia. But other investigators say that such claims are beyond tenuous. There are no facts about Israel, declares Jeffrey Carr, founder and chief executive of Taia Global, a cybersecurity consulting company in Tysons Corner, Virginia. 6.3 The Aftermath The who? may never be discovered. Active investigation of Stuxnet effectively came to an end in February 2011, when Symantec posted a final update to its definitive report on the virus, including key details about its execution, lines of attack and spread over time. Microsoft had long since patched the security holes that Stuxnet exploited, and all the antivirus companies had updated their customers digital immune systems with the ability to recognize and shut down Stuxnet on sight. New infections are now rare although they do still occur, and it will take years before all the computers with access to Siemens controllers are patched. If Stuxnet itself has ceased to be a serious threat, however, cybersecurity experts continue to worry about the larger vulnerabilities that it exposed. Stuxnet essentially laid out a blueprint for future attackers to learn from and perhaps improve, say many of the investigators who have studied it. In a way, you did open the Pandoras box by launching this attack, says Langner of his suspicions about the United States. And it might turn back to you guys eventually. Cybersecurity experts are ill-prepared for the threat, in part because they lack ties to the people who understand industrial control systems. Weve got actually two very different worlds that traditionally have not communicated all that much, says Eric Byres, co-founder and chief technology officer of Tofino Industrial Security in Lantzville, Canada. He applauds Symantec, Langner and others for reaching across that divide. But the effort required to make those connections substantially delayed the investigation. The divide extends into university computer-science departments, say Byres, himself an ex-academic. Researchers tend to look at industrial-control security as a technical problem, rather than an issue requiring serious scientific attention, he says. So when graduate students express interest in looking at, say, cryptography and industrial controls, they are told that the subject is not mathematically challenging enough for a dissertation project. Im not aware of any academic researchers who have invested significantly in the study of Stuxnet, agrees Andrew Ginter, director of industrial security for the North American group of Waterfall Security Solutions, based in Tel Aviv, Israel. Almost the only researchers doing that kind of work are in industrial or government settings among them a team at the Idaho National Laboratory working on a next-generation system called Sophia, which tries to protect industrial control systems against Stuxnet-like threats by detecting anomalies in the network. One barrier for academics working on cybersecurity is access to the malware that they must protect against. That was not such a problem for Stuxnet itself, because its code was posted on the web shortly after it was first identified. But in general, the careful safeguards that Symantec and other companies put in place in secure labs to protect the escape of malware may also inadvertently be a barrier for researchers who need to study them. If youre doing research into biological agents, its limited groups that have them and they are largely unwilling to share; the same holds true for malware, says Anup Ghosh, chief scientist at the Center for Secure Information Systems at George Mason University in Fairfax, Virginia. To advance the field, researchers need access to good data sets, says Ghosh, who was once a programme manager at the US Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, and is now working on a malware detector designed to identify viruses on the basis of how they behave, rathe r than on specific patterns in their code, known as signatures. Academic researchers are also inhibited by a certain squeamishness about digital weaponry, according to Herb Lin, chief scientist at the Computer Science and Telecommunications Board of the US National Research Council in Washington DC. He points out that to understand how to guard against cyberattacks, it may help to know how to commit them. Yet teaching graduate students to write malware is very controversial, he says. People say, What do you mean: youre training hackers?' 6.4 Preparing for the Next Attack A study last year by the JASON group, which advises the US government on science and technology matters, including defence, found broad challenges for cybersecurity (JASON Science of Cyber-Security; MITRE Corporation, 2010). Perhaps most important was its conclusion that the field was underdeveloped in reporting experimental results, and consequently in the ability to use them. Roy Maxion, a computer scientist at Carnegie Mellon University in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, who briefed JASON, goes further, saying that cybersecurity suffers from a lack of scientific rigour. Medical professionals over the past 200 years transformed themselves from purveyors of leeches to modern scientists with the advent of evidence-based medicine, he notes. In computer science and in computer security in particular, that train is nowhere in sight. Computer science has developed largely as a collection of what Maxion calls clever parlour tricks. For example, at one conference, the leading paper showed how researchers could read computer screens by looking at the reflections off windows and other objects. From a practical point of view, anyone in a classified meeting would go, pooh, he says. In places where they dont want you to know [whats on the computer screen], there are no windows. Yet, that was the buzz that year. Maxion sees an urgent need for computer-science and security curricula to include courses in traditional research methods, such as experimental design and statistics none of which is currently required. Why does it matter? he asks. Because we dont have a scientific basis for investigating phenomena like Stuxnet, or the kind of defences that would be effective against it. Also troubling for many of the Stuxnet investigators was the US governments lacklustre response to the virus (assuming that it was not the perpetrator). Stuxnet represents a new generation of cyberweapon that could be turned against US targets, but there is no evidence that the government is making the obvious preparations for such an attack for example, plans for a coordinated response that pools resources from academia, research institutes and private business. Other countries seem to be taking the threat more seriously. Some of Chinas universities and vocational colleges have reportedly forged strong connections with the military to work on cybersecurity, for example. And Israel also seems to be exploiting its computing expertise for national security. A few months before the discovery of Stuxnet, Yuval Elovici, a computer scientist and director of Deutsche Telekom Laboratories at Ben-Gurion University of the Negev in Beersheba, Israel, told Nature that he was working closely with the countrys Ministry of Defense on cybersecurity. He presciently warned that the next wave of cyberattacks would be aimed at physical infrastructures. What would happen if there were a code injection into SCADA? What if someone would activate it suddenly? Elovici asked. He and other experts have been warning for several years now that such an attack on SCADA systems controlling the electricity grid could spark nationwide blackouts, or that the safety systems of power plants could be overridden, causing a shutdown or a serious accident. Similar disruptions could hit water and sewage systems, or even food processing plants. Such attacks, Elovici warned, are both realistic and underestimated. Asked how bad one would be, Elovici was unequivocal. I think, he said, it would be much stronger than the impact of setting several atomic bombs on major cities.

Frederick Winslow Taylor: The Father of Scientific Management :: Frederick Taylor Management Labor Essays

Frederick Winslow Taylor: The â€Å"Father of Scientific Management† Introduction This paper is in response to the assignment for a paper and short speech concerning a person with relevant contributions to the world of management. Frederick Taylor is affectionately referred to as the â€Å"Father of Scientific Management.† The modern systems of manufacturing and management would not be the examples of efficiency that they are today, without the work of Taylor. Frederick Taylor was instrumental in bringing industry out of the dark ages by beginning to revolutionize the way work was approached. Taylor was able to increase wages, productivity and reduce per piece costs at the same time. Taylor's work was eventually adopted in a wide array of applications. Taylor's ideas had a significant influence on the industrial life of all modernized countries. Even Lenin went as far as to publish an article in Pravda , â€Å"Raising the Productivity of Labour,† based on the writings of Taylor. Thus Taylor changed the way the world conducted business. Taylor's work was an extension of technology. It was a marriage of human work and technology. His Priniciples of Scientifiic Management was conceived to be free of value judgement. The Younger Years   Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Frederick W. Taylor was born into a well-to-do family in Philadelphia in 1856 . His family was not wealthy , but they were well exposed to the high culture of the local society. Growing up it was expected that Taylor would study to become an attorney. Taylor attended Phillips-Exeter Academy. He was a devout student, doing very well with his studies. To achieve good grades, Taylor studied many long hours. It was quite unfortunate that Taylor was to miss Harvard Law School due to bad eyes that doctors attrributed to studying in the poor light of a kerosene lamp. In later years it was realized that his eye problem was actually caused by stress, as it improved after he left Phillips. Taylor moved back home after graduating from Phillips. He realized that he should take up a trade and got a job as an apprentice machinist and pattern maker. Having spent four years learning his trade, Taylor got a job as a yard laborer at Midvale Steel Company.   Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Taylor realized that at this point he needed to continue his education. He convinced the people at Stevens Institute of Technology to allow him to attend classes long distance. He would study in his spare time in Philadelphia and go to the school in New Jersey to take his exams. In June of 1883, Taylor graduated with a Mechanical Engineering degree. He subsequently joined the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME).

Modernism Essay

How does the author of this extract understand modernism? Support your response with a direct quote from the text. Modernism can be described as a movement that has been took place in late nineteenth and early twentieth century. This essay will discuss how the author understand modernism by, explaining how modernism eventuated to the integration of mankind and the way that it can jeopardize past traditions and create new ideas. Firstly, it can be mentioned that one of the outcomes of modernism is the destruction of limits and borders. It results to accretion of society and devastation of classes and believes and unite all members of that society. Berman believes that modernism is a paradoxical integration, as he states: â€Å"modernism pours us all into a maelstrom of perpetual disintegration and renewal, of struggle and contradiction, of ambiguity and anguish. †(Berman, 1982). This quote suggests that modernity is the termination of some diversities which may result to severity. Secondly, it can be noted that the experiences of modernity have been considered as a fulmination to believes and history of the society. However, there is a group of ethics and ideas that have been created during this movement. Berman states that: â€Å"although most of these people have probably experienced modernity as a radical threat to all their history and traditions, it has, in the course of five centuries, developed a rich history and a plenitude of traditions of its own. †(Berman, 1982). These new ideas can assist society to control the new way of their life and make it their own. In conclusion, this essay explained modernism with referring to some ideas and quotes of the author. Firstly, it explained the way that modernism unit all members of a society and secondly how modernism can develop new traditions as well as threating the old ones. Furthermore, todays society is experiencing post- modernism, which is a great result of what happened in twentieth century and how people harmonized themselves with modern life.

It’s Not Child Labor, its Child Abuse Essay

Patrick Kearny, a nine and a half year old boy died in a horrible mine accident (Freedman 52). He’s not the only one. In the 20th Century, many children got physical deformities and were in accidents while they were working their tough, harsh jobs. Many young working children got diseases. Others got severe burns. Cuts and physical deformities were popular as well. Imagine that you are working at night, a tall big man screaming at you to not stop and you are just getting little pay. On top of that you just accidentally burned your legs. This was very popular. Burning occurred in coal mines and glass factories. In the mines, children were not protected very much. They barely wore gloves, so their hands were at risks. Accidents happened often. In 1911, Lewis Hine was photographing in a mine. He observed two young children accidentally falling onto burning hot coal and died, right there. â€Å"â€Å"While I was there, two breaker boys fell or were carried into the coal chute, where they were smothered to death,† Hine reported from a Pennsylvania Mine† (Freedman 48). Many children lied about their age when working like Patrick Kearny and Dennis McKee. He was a 15 year old boy who lost his life by falling into a chute at an Avondale Mine (Freedman 52). Also, 15 year old Arthur Albecker burned and injured both of his legs. So, not only do these young children work in a horrible environment, but accidents happen a lot in mines. Also, burning happened frequently in glass factories. â€Å"†¦minor accidents from burning are common. â€Å"Severe burns†¦are regular risks of the trade in glass-bottle making,† says Mrs. Florence Kelly.† (Spargo 2). These accidents happen because the jobs include use extremely hot glass. Also children, have to heat glass near flames. Not only did these small, poor, innocent children get burned, but many children got terrible diseases while working tough jobs. Spinners commonly experience disease. â€Å"The hot, steamy air was filled with dust and lint that covered the workers’ clothes and made it hard to breathe. Mill workers frequently developed tuberculosis, chronic bronchitis, and other respiratory diseases.† (Freedman 35). Those weren’t the only respiratory diseases children got. In 1902, several miners got miners’ asthma now known as pneumoconiosis (Derickson 4).That is a disease of the lungs caused by inhaling mineral or metallic dust over a long period of time. This comes about by a lot of exposure to mine dust while the workers are still children. (Derickson 4). Also, children got tuberculosis, rickets, and other diseases like the common hookworm disease. (Derickson 4). Hookworm disease, which is widespread among farmers, is a blood-sucking, nematode worm (found in textile plan ts) that goes through the skin, attaching itself to the intestinal walls with its hooked mouthparts. Rickets is a disease, especially of children, caused by a lack in vitamin D that makes the bones become soft and prone to bending and structural change. In addition, children popularly got rheumatism. It is a disease which joint or muscles pain. Also the common cold was frequent. This happens when being in two extreme temperatures. In glass factories, young boys are next to a scorching furnace to a freezing room where they cool off glass (Spargo 3). Young children had to work harsh jobs that aren’t safe at all. They may get diseases. It is simply immoral. Lastly, children got dreadful cuts and physical deformities. Cuts were common in farming. â€Å"In the fall, the mature beets were pulled from the ground and were â€Å"topped†. Topping required holding a beet against the knee and slicing off the top with a sixteen-inch knife that had a sharp prong at one end. Accidents happened all too often. â€Å"I hooked my knee with the beet knife,† a seven-year old boy told Hine, â€Å"but I just went on working.† (Freedman 67). So, very young kids of age, 5, 6, 7, handled one foot and a half long knives. You can guess that accidents happened often. Also, doffers got cut plenty. (Freedman, 35)A young boy tripped into a spinning machine. (Freedman 35) He accidentally tore out two of his fingers. (Freedman, 35) This was very common. Also, physical deformities happened. Reformers found that premature employment shortened normal physical development. (Derickson 4) So if young children worked, they became short, underage adults. (Derickson 4) They also found that children that worked had flat feet by standing and walking all day with improper footgear and a curved spine by bending while working for several hours. (Derickson 4) In conclusion, accidents and physical deformities happened very repeatedly in the early 20th century. Accidents like burning were twice as common in children as with adults. Diseases were popular too. Lastly, physical deformities affected these children for the rest of their already short lives. Spine-curving and flat feet were common. Risks of pesticide intoxication occurred too. The list is endless. So as you can see, child labor is unhealthy, unfair, unjust, and immoral. It should be called child abuse, as that’s what it is. Don’t you think that children deserve an education? Children deserve better than working in an unhealthy and hazardous place. Children deserve to live longer. Children deserve to be children. Works Cited Cleland, Hugh G. â€Å"Child Labor.† Encyclopedia Americana. 2008. Grolier Online. 19 Oct. 2008 http://ea.grolier.com/cgi-bin/article?assetid=0090989-00 Derickson, Alan. â€Å"Making Human Junk: Child Labor as a Health Issue in the Progressive Era† SIRS Knowledge Source, 1992.19 Oct. 2008 http://sks.sirs.com/cgi-bin/hst-article-display?id=SMIAMIDADE-0-5114&artno=0000270 Freedman, Russell. Kids at Work: Lewis Hine and the Crusade Against Child Labor. New York; Houghton Mifflin Company.1994 Spargo, John. â€Å"The Bitter Cry of the Children (excerpt)† American History Online. 1906. Facts On File, Inc. 19 Oct 2008 http://fofweb.com/NuHistory?default..asp?ItemID=WE52&NewItemID=True